Jean-philippe Jean-philippe từ Gatteo FC, Italy

jeanphilipe

11/24/2024

Dữ liệu người dùng, đánh giá và đề xuất cho sách

Jean-philippe Jean-philippe Sách lại (10)

2019-11-30 06:30

48 Nguyên Tắc Chủ Chốt Của Quyền Lực (Tái bản lần 9) Thư viện Sách hướng dẫn

Sách được viết bởi Bởi: Robert Greene

Economist Raghuram Rajan was one of the prescient ones: at a central bankers' conference (honoring Alan Greenspan no less) in 2005, he delivered a paper asking "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?" His answer was yes. Events proved him correct. Here, he uses a wide-angle lens to examine the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, and why we're nowhere near out of danger. A stint as chief economist at the IMF means his perspective is global; understanding growth patterns and rates in developing countries, and financial crises such as the Asian meltdown of 1997, help us understand what's happening in the U.S. He argues that interest rates were kept very low - credit very loose - in order to help the lower class get a leg up. Since their income had stagnated, and since better education to pull them into the middle and upper classes is a very long-term solution and thus extremely difficult to achieve politically, policymakers helped low-income Americans achieve a higher standard of living by allowing them to buy homes and pull equity out of their homes. Needless to say, this went on too long, and the real estate bubble was created. Americans overconsumed, took on onerous debt, and thus enabled the countries we were buying from, mainly Germany, Japan, and China, to shortchange their own economies by relying too much on growth from exports. If we had a stronger safety net in the U.S., Rajan argues, we wouldn't need to rely on fiscal and monetary policies to provide stimulus to the poor and/or unemployed. When the Fed, the Treasury, and politicians use stimulus this way during jobless recoveries, whether by keeping interest rates extremely low or passing legislation to pump billions into the economy, it has unintended and damaging consequences: it creates bubbles, it advantages debtors and disadvantages savers, it's a gigantic giveaway to the banks, it artificially props up the housing market and housing prices, and it warps incentives in the financial sector. Rajan urges reforms in two areas: the financial sector, and the safety net. In the financial sector, incentives are dangerously aligned with taking on risk. Wall Street assumes that certain institutions will be bailed out if they fail, and they are correct in this. Rajan uses the phrase "too systemic to fail" rather than "too big to fail," because it's not size but interconnectedness that determines when government will step in and rescue. Government rescues must stop, because they distort the entire financial sector. Financial institutions should know what their risk exposures are, and this information should be made available to the markets on a regular basis; during the financial crisis, many companies had no idea how much risk they had taken on. If this information is widely known, it can be used to prevent institutions from becoming "systemic." He proposes that financial institutions have a "living will:" in the event that they are going to fail, such a "will" would involve regulators in quickly winding down (resolving) the company without massive, systemic damage. In order to more properly align individual risk-taking with compensation, he proposes holding a significant chunk of a financial company's bonuses in escrow, to be paid out only after it is clear that trading positions have been profitable. He also suggests phasing out bank deposit insurance, since a money-market fund invested in Treasury bills is just as safe as guaranteed bank deposits. Reforming the safety net needs to be another top priority. Recessions have changed, in that the last few recoveries have been jobless, and our current system of unemployment benefits is inadequate in the face of extended periods of joblessness. Politicians respond to the needs of the unemployed in ad hoc ways, and as we've seen recently, they have held benefit extensions hostage to the passage of other, unrelated legislation. Rajan suggests that we tie benefits to a formula which would take into account the extent of overall job losses, "the proportion of jobs created to jobs lost, and the time elapsed since the recession began." He also proposes a system of universal healthcare, given that job loss nearly always comes with a loss of health insurance as well. I enjoyed Fault Lines. I found it highly readable. There are some areas where, although clearly informed, Rajan seems a little out of his element (the discussion of healthcare, perhaps). He also is overly wedded to the notion that Fannie and Freddie and the affordable housing mandate are to blame for most of the mortgage crisis: "It is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that this was a market driven largely by government, or government-influenced, money." Indubitably Fannie and Freddie have to take some of the blame, but as others have demonstrated, it was Wall Street which created the intense and insatiable demand for subprime mortgages; Fannie and Freddie were actually latecomers to the subprime frenzy. As Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera showed in All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis, Fannie and Freddie raced to get involved in subprime mortgages because they feared being left behind by their private sector competition.

2019-11-30 08:30

Ánh thép Lũng Nhai ( Cổ kiếm Kỳ thư - Phần III) Thư viện Sách hướng dẫn

Sách được viết bởi Bởi: Phan Cảnh Trung

You can read the plot anywhere, but here’s a brief recap: Rachel’s a good girl in NYC. Darcy, her best friend since kindergarten is marrying Rachel’s friend from law school, Dex. One night, when Darcy heads home, Dex and Rachel have a drink and end up sleeping together. Instead of it being a one night mistake, they continue the affair even as Dex and Darcy’s nuptials approach. Rachel feels horribly guilty about this, but that doesn’t stop her from continuing to see Dex even as she continues to help Darcy plan the wedding. Rachel likes Dex, she likes being with Dex, and she likes the way Dex makes her feel, so she keeps putting off the part where she needs to confront him about what they’re doing. So many women, myself included have ended up in the same quagmire. You know that you should give an ultimatum, either be with me or let’s cut our losses now, but finding yourself unwilling to give up that spark of joy that happens whenever his number shows up on the caller ID. Rachel and Darcy’s relationship, a female friendship full of loyalty and duplicity is realistically described as well. Darcy may be self-centered and immature, but as long as it doesn’t interfere with what she wants, she wants everyone to be happy. To be fair, Darcy doesn’t seem entirely aware that she is ever doing anything wrong. Rachel has been comfortable with the status quo, her lady-in-waiting to Darcy’s queen. She is actually surprised to find herself actively resenting Darcy once her affair with Dex begins. Initially, she assumes it’s a way for her brain to justify the affair, but when she speaks to an old friend, she’s surprised to find that many people believe Darcy uses Rachel as her personal doormat. Rachel looks back at their years of friendship, all the slights and jealousies, but also the happy, good times. Relationships are complicated, you see. Bottom-line: If you’re a reader of chick lit, this is likely something you’ve already read. I liked it more than I thought I would. I’m glad I read it, but I don’t think it is one I’d read again.

Người đọc Jean-philippe Jean-philippe từ Gatteo FC, Italy

Người dùng coi những cuốn sách này là thú vị nhất trong năm 2017-2018, ban biên tập của cổng thông tin "Thư viện Sách hướng dẫn" khuyến cáo rằng tất cả các độc giả sẽ làm quen với văn học này.